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I. Introduction
In August 2007, Mattel, Inc. ("Mattel") filed a lawsuit in United States
District Court, claiming that adult entertainer Terri Gibson, under the
moniker "China Barbie," 2 infringed upon Mattel's Barbie doll trademark

with her pornographic

"www.chinabarbie.com." 3

website

maintained

at the

domain name

Mattel claimed that China Barbie used the

Barbie trademarks intending to trade on Mattel's enormous goodwill to
enhance the commercial value of her products and services. 4 Mattel feared
that her use of the domain name would cause irreparable damage and

requested transference of the domain name to Mattel, treble damages or
profits earned, and statutory damages under the Anticybersquatting
Consumer Protection Act ("ACPA"),5 and punitive damages. 6 Filing of the

"China Barbie" complaint attracted significant attention in the legal
community, where most perceived the lawsuit as frivolous and a reflection
of Mattel's over-litigiousness protection of its Barbie trademark .

2. In addition to "China Barbie," Terri Gibson's other aliases include Tearabue S. Gibson
and Teranie Sharail Gibson. Her company, China Global Networks, was also listed as a
defendant in the complaint. Complaint at 1, Mattel, Inc. v. Global China Networks, LLC, No. 07
Civ. 7418 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 23, 2007), 2007 WL 2509011.
3. Id. at 8-9.
4. Id. at 9. Mattel asserted four causes of action against China Barbie: (1) a common law
claim for unfair competition; (2) trademark infringement (15 U.S.C. § 1114(a) (2006)); (3)
trademark dilution under the FTDA (15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2006)); and (4) violation of the ACPA
(15 U.S.C. § 1125(d) (2006)). Id. at 9-12.
5. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d).
6. Complaint, supra note 1, at 8, 13.
7. See Peter Lattman, Was Mattel v. China Barbie Spawned by a Google Search?, WALL STREEr
JOURNAL LAW BLOG, Aug. 23, 2007, http://blogs.wsj.comlaw/2007/08/23/ was-mattel-v-china-barbiespawned-by-a-google-search (last visited December 21, 2007); Peter Lattman, Mattel FiresBack at ChinaChina
Barbie,
WALL
STREEr
JOURNAL
LAW
BLOG,
Aug.
22,
2007,
http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2007/08/22/mattel-fires-back-at-china-china-barbie (Last visited: Dec. 31, 2007);
Jared Beck, Mattel Sues China,chinabarbiecom, That Is, THE MAGIC CIrY HARVARD LAWYER: A HIGHOCrANE,
UNFILTERED
REPORT
FROM
MIAMI,
FLORIDA,
Aug.
22,
2007,
http://beckandlee.wordpress.com/207/08/22/mattel-sues-china-chinabarbiecom-that-is (Last visited: Dec. 31,
2007); Marc J. Randazza, Barbie v. China Barbie, THE LEGAL SATYRICON, Aug. 22, 2007,
http://randazza.wordpress.com/2007/08122/ barbie/oC2%AE-v-china-barbieI (Last visited- Dec. 31, 2007). In
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Nonetheless, China Barbie soon defaulted and the www.chinabarbie.com
domain name was transferred to Mattel. 8 China Barbie was further
"enjoined from cybersquatting upon, infringing or diluting Mattel's
registered trademarks." 9 This lawsuit turns on facts unique to the Internet
age; however, it signals only the latest stage in Mattel's fifty year history of
vigorously protecting Barbie's image as a wholesome children's toy and
American
icon through marketing strategies, and when appropriate, legal
0
action.'
The Intemet is essential to the success of businesses, both in the real and
cyber worlds."1 E-commerce's rapid expansion and exponential growth created a
greater need than ever for strong systems to protect trademarks to ensure that
development and cultivation of trademarks remains worthwhile for trademark
owners. 12 However, as trademark property rights expanded during the twentieth
century, many legal commentators became concerned about the overprotection of
trademarks at the expense of First Amendment principles. 13 Recent enactment of
an interview with the New York Post,China Barbie stated that she maintained her website at the domain name
for five years without Mattel taking action. Many members of the legal community, and China Barbie herself,
suspect that Mattel strategically brought this lawsuit to divert attention away from negative publicity
surrounding Mattel's defective toy manufacturing in China, which threatened consumers with lead poisoning.
See Lattman, Was Mattel v. China Barbie Spawned by a Google Search?, supra; Hasani Gittens, Sex Doll:
YORK
POST
(Aug.
23,
2007),
available at
Quit
Toyin'
With
Me,
NEW
with me.htm. See
http://www.nypost.com/seven/08232007/news/nationalnews/sex dollquit- toyin
generally Mattel CEO: 'Rigorous standards' after massive toy recall, CNN.COM, Nov. 15, 2007,
http://www.cnn.com/2007/US/08/14/ recall/index.himil; Mattel recalls Chinese Barbietoys in lead scare, THE
INDEPENDENT, Sept. 5, 2007, http://news. independentco.uk/business/ news/article2931786.ece.
8. Mattel, Inc. v. Global China Networks, LLC, No. 07 Civ. 7418 (S.D.N.Y Oct. 23, 2007),
WL 3332662, at *1.
9. Id.
10. See generally M. G. LORD, FOREVER BARBIE: THE UNAUTHORIZED BIOGRAPHY OF A
REAL DOLL (Walker Publishing Co., 2004) (1994); THE BARBIE CHRONICLES: A LIVING DOLL

TURNS FORTY (Yona Zeldis ed., McDonough, ed., Simon and Schuster New York, 1999); MARY F.
ROGERS, BARBIE CULTURE (Sage Publications, 1999).
11. William G. Barber, Louis T. Pirkey, and Mark T. Garrett, Recent Developments in
Trademark Law: CybersquattersRun for Cover, While Copycats Breathe a Sigh ofRelief 9 TEX.
INTELL. PROP. L.J. 231, 268 (2001).
12. Id. See also Mark A. Lemley, Ex Ante Versus Ex Post Justificationsfor Intellectual
Property, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 129, 129 (2004).
13. Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, Trademarksand ConsumerSearch Costs on the Internet,41
HOUS. L. REV. 77, 779-81 (2004) (noting that trademark infringement protection has shifted from traditional
consumer confusion rationale toward scrutiny over whether a "challenged use diverts attention away from the
trademark holder"); Jacqueline D. Lipton, Commerce Versus Commentary: Gripe Sites, Parody and the First
Amendment in Cyberspace,84 WASH. U. L. REV. 1327,1330-31 (2006). When trademark rights were limited
to the prevention of consumer confusion regarding the source and substance of products, free speech was less
likely to be implicated Robert C. Denicola, Trademarks as Speech: ConstitutionalImplications of the
Emerging Rationalesfor the Protectionof Trade Symbols, 1982 WIS. L. REV. 158, 166 (1982). "The first
amendment... does not operate to restrict the rights afforded trademark owners under traditional doctrine.
Trademark law, however, has sometimes ventured beyond the confines of the confusion model. Those
seeking to extend the scope of trademark protection have championed models more closely allied with
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the Federal Trademark Dilution Act ("FTDA") 14 and the ACPA' 5 have created
new challenges for balancing trademark property rights and the public's free
speech.16 This tension is exemplified by the current website domain name
registration system, which is at the heart of Mattel's claims against China Barbie. 7
This Note will use Mattel's claim against China Barbie as a paradigm to
argue that the balance between trademark owners' property interests and the
public's free speech rights in the Internet domain name registration system
should be reevaluated. First, this Note will discuss the non-trademark
connotations of Barbie due to its incorporation into public discourse and societal
vocabulary, which lends it a secondary public domain role that is beyond the
reach and regulation of trademark law. As demonstrated by Mattel's excessive
litigation, 8 this Note will further argue that current trademark law, particularly
the ACPA, excessively protects trademark owners and impedes the public's free
speech. Finally, this Note will propose alternative methods to protect the
goodwill of trademarks, without compromising the public's free speech.
Part I of this Note discusses trademark law's expansion from its
"likelihood-of-confusion" origins to the more protective FTDA, and the
ACPA. It also addresses conflicts between the First Amendment and the
ACPA. Part II discusses Barbie's status as an American icon and Barbie's
history of trademark litigation, and then specifically discusses litigation
involving the ACPA. Finally, Part III argues that Barbie has become a cultural
icon that holds value in public discourse that cannot be curtailed by trademark
protection. Part III will also argue that the ACPA fails to strike the appropriate
balance between trademark property rights and the public's First Amendment
entitlements.

II. The Evolution of Trademark Law:
From Likelihood of Confusion to the ACPA
This section traces trademark law developments during the twentieth
century, an evolution that reflects a paradigmatic shift from a focus on consumer
protection to ensure that products are accurately represented to them, to a broader
property than with tort. When consumer confusion ceases to be the touchstone, however, the accommodation
between irademark law and the first
amendment becomes more problematic." Id.
14. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2006).
15. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d) (2006).
16. As the scope of trademark property rights has expanded, trademark infringement claims now
regularly arise in the context of social commentary, criticism, and artistic expression, which in turn
implicate First Amendment issues. See Lipton, supra note 12, at 1327, 1332 (noting the poor balance
between free speech protection and commercial trademark interests in the context of Intemet domain
names of parody and gripe websites).
17. Complaint, supra note 1,at 9.
18. Lattman, Mattel Fires Back at China-ChinaBarbie, supra note 1; see also discussion
supra Part IIB.

2009]

TRADEMARK BATTLES INA BARBIE-CYBER WORLD

focus on trademark owners' rights, without any clear scope. This section
concludes that trademark law's more recent focus poses a threat to the public's
free speech rights due to its ambiguity. Part A of this section outlines the
"likelihood of confusion" theory, the traditional form of relief available to
trademark owners. Part B highlights the FTDA and the ACPA; and finally, Part
C addresses the tension between modem trademark law and the First
Amendment.
A.

Basic Principles: Goals of Traditional Trademark Law and the
Likelihood of Confusion Standard

Federal trademark law was codified in the Lanham Trademark Act in 1946,
which defines a "trademark" as "any word, name, symbol, or device, or any
combination thereof.., used by a person... to identify and distinguish his or
her goods . . .from those manufactured or sold by others and to indicate the

source of the goods, even if that source is unknown." 19 Under this original
paradigm, trademark law had two goals: (1) protecting consumers by ensuring
that all purchases were fully informed; and (2) ensuring that trademark owners,
who invest resources in the cultivation of their trademark's goodwill, are
protected from misappropriation of that goodwill.2 ° Both reflect a common
concern: prevention of unauthorized trademark use that causes public
confusion.2 1 A use constitutes trademark infringement under the Lanham Act if
it is:

likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as to the
affiliation, connection, or association of such person with another person,
or as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of his or her goods, services,
or commercial activities by another person, or... in commercial
advertising or promotion, misrepresents the nature, characteristics,
qualities, or geographic origin of22his or her or another person's goods,
services, or commercial activities.
The likelihood of confusion standard protects a trademark from a
variety of harms; however, its limitations are evident in its requirementstrademark holders must prove the likelihood of error or direct or indirect
19. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2006); see also Christopher M. Kindel, When Digital Contacts Equal
Minimum Contacts: How Fourth Circuit Courts Should Assess Personal Jurisdiction in
TrademarkDisputes Over Internet Domain Names, 78 N.C.L. REV. 2105, 2111 (2000).
20. The Lanham Act codifies these goals in two provisions, one addresses infringement of
registered trademarks (15 U.S.C. § 1114(1) (2006)) and another addresses infringement of
unregistered rights. (15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1) (2006)).
21. Lipton, supra note 12, at 1335.
22. 15 U.S.C. 1125 (a)(1)(A) & (B). Courts have developed various likelihood-ofconfusion tests that consider common elements, including: the alleged infringer's intent; actual
confusion; and market factors that consider the relationship between the goods and services at
issue and the trade channels. Lipton, supra note 12, at 1335.
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23
competition between its own goods and the unauthorized use by another.
This leaves a trademark vulnerable to misappropriation beyond these
limits; for example, unauthorized use that associates a trademark with
goods that are not related to the business of the trademark holder. 24 These
shortcomings did not become prominent or relevant until the economic
system behind trademark value became more sophisticated and called for
trademark holders to be protected as "owners" with property rights.25

B. Evolution of Trademark Law over the Course of the Twentieth Century
During the latter part of the twentieth century, trademark law evolved
beyond traditional trademark infringement and broadened trademark owner's
rights.26 This was a response to the perceived shortcomings of traditional
likelihood of confusion trademark infringe-ment and reflected an evolving
understanding of the status of property rights, the role of trademarks in
marketing, and their economic value.27 This section highlights the development
of the trademark dilution doctrine and anticybersquatting law and policy, both of
which provided the theoretical and statutory basis for Mattel's claims against
China Barbie.28
1. Enactment of the FTDA

In 1995, the FTDA was enacted to expand the Lanham Act. 29 It
introduced the theory of trademark dilution and provided additional remedies
to trademark owners. 30 The FTDA defines "dilution" as "the lessening of the

23. Jennifer S. Cook, Comment, Enforcing the FederalDilution TrademarkAct of 1995 and
the AnticybersquattingAct of 1999: Judicial DiscretionAdvised, I Hous. BUS. & TAX L.J. 224,
231 (2001).
24. "[T]he unique nature of a mark will be destroyed by companies who trade on the
renown of the mark by selling unrelated goods, such as Kodak pianos or Buick aspirin." Mark A.
Lemley, The Modern Lanham Act and the Death of Common Sense, 108 YALE L.J. 1687, 1698
(1999).
25. Id.
at 1697. "rflhe economics of trademark law has grown more sophisticated over the last fifly years,
but it has not abandoned its roots. The economic rationale for trademarks today isroughly the same as it was a
half-century ago." Id.Professor Lemley argues that increasingly "propertizing" trademarks comes at societal

costs because it creates "lost opportunities" by suppressing opportunities for "important political and social
commentary." Id.at 1696. "Vesting trademarks with the mantle of property--and giving them some of the
indicia of real property, such as free transferability--defeats the purpose of linking trademarks to goods in the first
place." Id.
at 1695-96.
26. Lemley, supra note 23, at 1695-96.
27. Id. at 1696-98.
28. Mattel asserted four causes of action against China Barbie: (1) a common claim for
unfair competition; (2) trademark infringement (15 U.S.C. § 1114(a)); (3) trademark dilution
under the FTDA (15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)); and (4) violation of the ACPA (15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)).
Complaint, supra note 1,at 9-12.
29. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c).
30. Cook, supra note 22, at 231.
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capacity of a famous mark to identify and distinguish goods or services,
regardless of the presence or absence of-(1) competition between the owner
of the famous mark and other parties, or (2) likelihood of confusion, mistake
or deception."31 Trademark dilution can be manifested either through
blurring or tarnishment. 32 Dilution through blurring occurs when the public
33
forms a mental connection between the mark and unauthorized use.
Confusion regarding the sponsorship of the good or service is not necessary,
mere mental connection that weakens the uniqueness of the trademark is
sufficient.34 In contrast, dilution by tarnishment requires an unauthorized use
to tarnish or degrade the quality of the mark.35
Most notably, the FTDA does not impose a consumer confusion
requirement for a claim.36 Under the FTDA, a trademark is protected from
losing its distinctiveness, which effectively protects a trademark from
completely unrelated, non-competing goods.37 Further, Congress did not
proffer requirements for how trademark owners may prove dilution, which
38
allows courts a great level of discretion in their decision-making.
Trademark dilution has been criticized as "an expansive notion because it
recognizes damage to a trademark holder irrespective of consumer
confusion" because of its undefined limits and opponents suggest that it
"erodes the foundations of traditional trademark law, which is premised on
protecting consumers from confusion as to the source of particular products
or services. 39

31. 15 U.S.C. § 1127. Trademark dilution theory stems from Frank Schechter's 1927 article
where he asserted a trademark's value and power derives from its "uniqueness and singularity"
and even non-confusing use would "gradual[ly] whittl[e] away or dispers[e] ...[its] identity and
hold upon the public mind of the [trade]mark." Frank 1. Schechter, The Rational Basis of
Trademark Protection, 40 HARV. L. REV. 813, 825 (1927). "The more distinctive or unique the
mark, the deeper is its impress on the public consciousness, and the greater its need for protection
against vitiation of dissociation from the particular product in connection with which it has been
used." Id.
32. Ned Snow, Article, The Constitutional Failing of the Anticybersquatting Act, 41
WILLAMETTE L. REV. 1, 12 (2005).
33. Id.
34. Id. at 13.
35. Id. at 12-13.
36. 15 U.S.C. § 1127.
37. Id.
38. Matthew S. Voss, Ringing Bros.- Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah
Division of Travel Development & Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc., 15 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 265,
266 (2000).
39. Lipton, supra note 12, at 1335.
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2.

The Rise of the Internet: The Website Domain Name RegistrationSystem and
its Intersection with TrademarkLaw

In the late 1990s, the Internet became an important outlet that allowed
businesses to better reach their consumers. 40

A website presence on the

Internet provided businesses with a new interactive advertising resource; they
could provide detailed information about their goods and services and allow
consumers to make purchases online, with decreased transaction costs. 4 1 The
commercial potential of this technology encouraged all businesses to set up
their own websites. 42

As businesses have increasingly established their

presence on the Internet, the limited number of available domain names, each
of which can only be occupied by one website on the Internet, has increased
the importance and value of domain names containing trademarked terms.
Businesses aim to ensure that their consumers could reach them in the
simplest way possible. 43 Domain names often consist of the name of an
individual, a company, or a trademark and function as unique identifiers,
similar to a telephone number or street address.44 Obtaining a domain name is
simple and inexpensive: an application must be filed with a domain name
registrar; who ensures that the domain name has not been previously registered
to another entity; and if the domain name is still available, it is issued-this is
easily accomplished over the Internet.45 Registrars usually require applicants

to represent that their registration and subsequent use of a domain name does
40. Donna L. Howard, Note and Comment, Trademarks and Service Marks and Internet
Domain Names: Giving ICANN Deference, 33 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 637, 641 (2001).
41. Id. at641.
42. Id. A review of the Mattel website on January 24, 2008, indicates Mattel's significant Internet
presence, including a variety of websites devoted to their different children's products. Moreover,
Google search results from the same date returned a number of websites related to Mattel's corporate
entity. This presence indicates Mattel's interest in websites that contain their trademarked terms and
websites that may be confused as one of their own.
43. Howard, supra note 39, at 641. Ifa user does not know the domain name of the website he
intends to reach, he can use an Internet search engine and type in keywords that would yield hundreds
of websites that match the words entered for the user to sort through. See also Panavision Int'l, L.P. v.
Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1319 (9th Cir. 1998); Cook, supra note 22, at 257. "[C]ompanies strongly
prefer that their domain name be comprised of the company or brand trademark and the suffix '.com."'
Howard, supra note 39, at 642.
44. See, e.g., Panavision, 141 F. 3d at 1318-19. All websites have domain names which
Internet users can easily enter into their web browser to navigate to the website of an individual or
company. Id. at 1318.
45. Howard, supra note 39 at 640-41. A domain name is an address that corresponds to only one
webpage. Domain names consist of top-level and second-level domain names. Top-level domain names
consist of a country code (such as ".us" for the United States or ".au." for Australia) or signify the type of
enterprise the website is involved in, such as ".edt" for educational, ".org" for non-profit organizations,
".gov" for government, ".net" for networks, and ".mil" for military. The ".com" domain name is the most
desirable and is used by commercial entities and also "serves as a catchall top-level domain." Second-level
domain names are composed of alphanumeric terms or a series of terms. Id. at 639-40. See alsosupra note
42.
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not infringe on a third party's rights and their use is not for unlawful
purposes. 46 However, the large number of applications makes it is impossible
for registrars to confirm applicants' representations. 4
As Internet usage by consumers expanded, the economic benefits of an
Internet presence has been more broadly recognized. 48 In turn, the "first-come,
first-served ' 49 domain name registration process led to a rush of individuals
registering domain names that contained trademarked terms, with the intention to
profit through their resale.50 Potential buyers who were willing to pay above and
beyond the basic registration fee51 included trademark owners who wanted domain
names containing their trademarked terms, business competitors who aimed to
disrupt competition by preventing their competitors from owning particular
domain names, or those who aimed to use a particular domain name to confuse
consumers and divert them to their own website. 52 These individuals became
known as "cyber pirates" or "cybersquatters." 53 "Cybersquatting" involves
"individ-uals seeking extortionate profits by reserving Intemet domain names that
are similar or identical to trademarked names with no intention of using the names
in commerce themselves. 54
Under trademark infringement and trademark dilution theories, the law
does not provide structured redress to trademark owners for the registration
of domain names that contained their trademarks by unauthorized users. 55 Its
reach was limited by how cybersquatters used the domain names; mere
registration of a domain name was not a trademark use, which placed the
typical cybersquatter outside the scope of the law. 56 Many plaintiffs argued
that registration of a domain name that contained a trademarked term was a
new form of trademark dilution. 7
Trademark dilution through

46. Id. at640-41.
47. Id.
48. See Marc Lorelli, Note, How Trademark Litigation Over Internet Domain Names Will
Change After Section 43(D) of the Lanham Act, 78 U. DET. MERCY L. REv. 97, 102(2000).
49. Id.
50. Howard, supra note 39, at 642; see also Lorelli, supranote 46, at 102.
51. The typical rate for registration was $100 in 1996. Intermatic, Inc. v. Toeppen, 947 F.
Supp. 1227, 1231 (N.D. Ill. 1996).
52. Howard, supra note 38, at 642; see also Lorelli, supra note 47, at 102.
53. Id.
54. H.R REP NO. 106-412, at 6 (1999).
55. Lorelli, supra note 47, at 102; See also Lockheed v. NSI, 985 F. Supp. 949 (C.D. Cal.
1997), affd, 194 F.3d 980 (9th Cir. 1999).
56. Lorelli, supra note 47, at 102-03.
57. Cook, supra note 21, at 257. This rationale was premised on the idea that consumers often
speculate that the website of a business is the business' proper name with the '.com' attached. If a
consumer attempts to retrieve that website and no website appears, the consumer either assumes the
business does not maintain an Internet presence or simply gives up trying to locate it. Id. at 257-58.
"[Tihis diminishes [for the consumers] 'the capacity of the marks to identify and distinguish the
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cybersquatting was found in Jntermaticv. Toeppen58 and again in Panavision
International, L.P. v. Toeppen.5 9 Both suits involved defendant Dennis
Toeppen, who registered two hundred domain names containing famous
trademarks, whose use and ownership only blocked their use by others. 60 His
intent to profit through this scheme of registration and resale to trademark
owners was undisputed. 6 1 Legislators saw this type of behavior as a threat
that "undermine[d] consumer confidence, discourage[d] consumer use of the
Internet, and destroy[ed]
the value of brand-names and trademarks of
62
American businesses.,
3.

The ACPA of 1999: Enactment and Background

In response to Toeppen-like cybersquatting behavior and the concerns
of legislators, President Clinton signed into law the ACPA, a new section
of the Lanham Act. For a remedy under the ACPA, the plaintiff must
demonstrate: (1) that the plaintiffs trademark is distinctive or famous; (2)
that the domain name is identical or confusingly similar to that of the
trademark owner's; and (3) that the defendant had bad faith intentions
when registering.6 3 Notably, the ACPA does not apply to "good faith,
innocent, or negligent uses of a domain name that is identical or
confusingly similar to another's mark or dilutive of a famous mark., 64 This

mark holder's goods and services on the Internet."' HQM, Ltd. v. Hatfield, 71 F. Supp. 2d 500, 508
(quoting Panavision, 141 F.3d at 1327).
58. 947 F. Supp. 1227 (N.D. I11.
1996).
59. 141 F.3d 1316 (9th Cir. 1998).
60. G.PETER ALBERT JR., WHITESEL LAFF & SARET LAFF, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW
IN CYBERSPACE 165 (BNA Books 1999); see also Intermatic, 947 F. Supp. 1227, 1232-33;
Panavision, 141 F.3d at 1319. An example of the unsubstantial websites Toeppen maintained at

these domain names was his use of"www.panaflex.com," where the webpage simply displays the
word "Hello." Id.
61. "Toeppen's argument misstates his use of the Panavision marc His use is not as benign as he
suggests. Toeppen's 'business' is to register trademarks as domain names and then sell them to the rightful
trademark owners. He 'act[s] as a 'spoiler,' preventing Panavision and others from doing business on the
Intemet under their trademarked names unless they pay his fee.' Id at 621. This is a commercial use. See
Intennatic, 947 F.Supp. at 1230 (stating that "[o]ne of Toeppen's business objectives is to profit by the resale
or licensing of these domain names, presumably to the entities who conduct business under these names.")."

Panavision,141 F.3d at 1325. The Ninth Circuit held, "Toeppen traded on the value of Panavision's marks.
So long as he held the Internet registrations, he curtailed Panavision's exploitation of the value of its
trademarks on the lntemet, a value which Toeppen then used when he attempted to sell the PanavisiorLcom
domain name to Panavision." Id
62.
63.

H.R. REP. NO. 106-412, at 6.
15 U.S.C. § l125(d)(1)(A).
145 CONG. REC.S14986-03, S15025 (daily ed. Nov. 19, 1999) (statement of Sen. Leahy), 1999

64.
WL 1050353; see also Hanods Ltd. v. Sixty Internet Domain Names, 110 F. Supp. 2d 420,425-26 (E.D. Va
2000) (concluding that a showing of bad faith is necessary in in rein jurisdiction proceedings under the
ACPA). To determine "bad faith," the ACPA proffers nine non-exhaustive factors for courts to consider.
Brenda R Sharton, DomainName Disputes: To Sue orNot toSue, 44 B. B.J. 10, 10, September/October 2000.
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reflects the ACPA's responsiveness to Toeppen-like cybersquatting, and it
calls for a court to consider the intent of the defendant in his domain name
registration, rather than the effect of mere registration.65
The ACPA also provides two additional "weapons" to trademark

owners to protect their trademarks that were previously unavailable:
jurisdiction and statutory damages.6 6 First, the ACPA provides for in rem
jurisdiction against the domain name itself, which alleviates trademark

owners' difficulties in locating the domain name's registrant, since many
cybersquatters register domain names under aliases and use false
information to avoid being identified.68 Second, in regards to remedies, the
ACPA allows a court to award injunctive relief barring the defendant's

further use of the domain name, cancellation or transference of the domain
name to the plaintiff, actual damages and profits, attorneys' fees, and
statutory damages in an amount between $1,000 and $100,000 per domain
name. 69 Additionally, the ACPA ensures that the actual bad faith
registrants are held accountable for their registration through limited
liability for domain name registrars.7v
Enactment of the ACPA addressed much of the bad faith cybersquatting
trademark owners encountered on the Internet.7' Judge Guido Calabresi of the

Four factors look for the absence of bad faith: (1)the defendant's intellectual property rights in the domain
name; (2) the domain name's similarity to the registrant's legal or otherwise identifying name; (3) the
registrant's prior commercial use of the domain name; and (4) the registrant's attempts to create a legitimate
website at the domain name. Five factors look for conduct that indicates circumstances of bad faith: (1)
whether the registrant intended to divert customers away from the trademark owner's website; (2) whether the
registrant's behavior imitates cybersquatters; (3) whether the registant used false information or an alias
during domain name registration; (4) whether the registrant's behavior reflects a pattern of acquiring multiple
domain names that are similar to or dilutive of other trademarks; and (5) whether the domain name
incorporates amark that is distinctive or famous under the Lanham Act. Id at 11.
65. Snow, supra note 31, at 3.
66. Sharton, supra note 63, at 11;see also Aaron L. Melville, Legal Update, New CybersquatingLaw
BringsM~iedReactonsfrom Trademark Owners,6 B.U.J. SCi.& TECH. L. 324, 325-26 (2000).
67. "A court's power to adjudicate the rights to a given piece of property, including the
power to seize and hold it." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 869 (8th ed. 2004).
68. S. REP. NO. 106-140, at 10 (1999).
69. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(dX2)(D)(i). These remedies are valuable to trademark owners because they ensure the
trademark owner receives some moreary reward 'he exqimse oflitigation (and length ofthe process)made it more
attractive for atrademark holder to simply pay up rather than fight as the best one could get at the end ofthe sometimes
arduous litigation process was a transfer ofthe name, A cybersquatter had very little downside in waiting to wear the
trademark holder down tirough the litigation process. Now, thetrademark holder starts
the battle armed with the
threat ofserious monetary damages (at least serious to the typically smaller company or individual who is holding the
domain name) available if they litigate and win The threat is sometimes enough to cause David to throw in the towel
much earlier on in a domain name battle with Goliath than under the old nles." Shartonsupra note 62, at 11.
70. Melville, supra note 65, at 327. Registrars, as middle men, are generally immune from
monetary damages and can only be subject to injunctive relief if they fail to cooperate with court
orders. Id.
71. Barber, supra note 10, at 235.
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Second Circuit stated, "the ACPA was passed to remedy the perceived
shortcomings of applying the FTDA in cybersquatting cases., 72 With the goal of
protecting businesses and promoting the growth of online commerce, the ACPA
broadened the scope of trademark property rights by allowing owners to prohibit
bad-faith and abusive Internet domain name registration of their distinctive marks
with the intent to profit from the goodwill associated with trademarks.73
C.

Modern Trademark Law and its Intersection with the First Amendment

Recent expansion of the scope of trademark law implicates free speech issues
more than ever.74 This section traces that evolution to reveal a pattern of conflict
that contextualizes Mattel's claim against China Barbie and how it reflects broader
curtailment of the public's free speech rights.
1.

FirstAmendment Rights and TrademarkDilution Theory

To reiterate, unlike a trademark infringement action, a trademark dilution
action does not have a likelihood of consumer confusion requirement. 75 Thus,
even if use of a trademark is found to be protected by the First Amendment
under traditional trademark infringement analysis, that same use may still
violate a trademark if examined through a dilution analysis. 76 Generally, under
a dilution analysis, unauthorized use of a trademark is permitted as free speech
only if one of two conditions is met: that the plaintiffs trademark was not
sufficiently famous to sustain a dilution action,77 or that the unauthorized use
was found to be noncommercial. 78 However, courts have carved out an
exception to this rule through their nuanced treatment of unauthorized
trademark invocation in the context of book, song, or movie titles.79
72. Cook, supra note 22, at 260 (quoting Sporty's Farm L.L.C. v. Sportsman's Mkt., Inc.,
202 F.3d 489, 496 (2d Cir. 2000)).
73. Cook, supra note 22, at 260.
74. In the traditional trademark infringement context, courts have developed their approach to First
Amendment conflict primarily through the lens of conflict with trademark parodies. Generally, courts have
taken one of three approaches: (1) adding a parody factor to their analysis under the traditional likelihood

of confusion standard; (2) requiring a higher bar for the traditional likelihood of confusion factors when a
trademark is invoked as part of some kind of artistic, social, or political message; and (3) applying the
traditional likelihood of confusion test fist and then conducting a separate inquiry in the balance between
the trademark owner's rights and the free speech rights of the defendant These frameworks share a
common deference to the public's First Amendment rights and simultaneously are considerate of
trademark owners' property rights. This reveals that an appropriate balance can be struck between these

competing concems without curtailment of either party's rights. However, achieving this balance has
become increasingly challenging under the FTDA and ACPA because the scope of trademark law has
been significantly broadened under these statutes. See supra Part I.B. 1.
75. See supra Part IBI.
76. Lipton, supra note 12, at 1338.
77. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1125(c), 1127.

78.

15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(4)(B).

79.

Lipton, supra note 12, at 1340-41.
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A vivid and relevant example is provided by Judge Alex Kozinski of
the Ninth Circuit in his treatment of a trademark infringement and dilution
action brought by Mattel against Aqua, a Danish pop music band, for their
Top Forty music hit "Barbie Girl" in Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records.80 The
song consists of a Barbie impersonation in a high-pitched, doll-like voice
and another band member, calling himself Ken, enticing Barbie to "go
party.'
Mattel claimed that the song's worldwide success affected
American foreign commerce and Mattel suffered monetary injury due to
those sales. 82 It is evident that Aqua's song is not only named after
Mattel's Barbie product, but its subject matter is also meant to evoke the
imagery of Barbie and her "lifestyle." Judge Kozinski's analysis in MCA
Records is twofold and addresses both aspects of Aqua's use of Barbie. 3
First, he considers the use of the term "Barbie" in the title;8 4 and second; he
considers Barbie's status in American culture and public discourse.85
In regards to the use of "Barbie" in the title of Aqua's song, Judge
Kozinski states,
There is no doubt that MCA uses Mattel's mark: Barbie is one half of
Barbie Girl. But Barbie Girl is the title of a song about Barbie and Ken,
a reference that-at least today-can only be to Mattel's famous couple.
We expect a title to describe the underlying
work, not to identify the
86
producer, and Barbie Girl does just that.
This characterization and treatment of the title "Barbie Girl" reflects
the unique treatment that titles receive in the context of the FTDA and may
be relevant to formulate policy for domain names, which are similar to
titles of original works: they are descriptive and identify an underlying
work.87 Professor Jacqueline Lipton develops this analogy as follows:
In the case of song, book, and movie titles, the title can describe the
underlying work in the sense that it gives some idea of what the title's
audience may expect the work to be about; for example, the "Barbie
Girl" song is most likely some kind of commentary on the Barbie Girl
doll and/or ideas she connotes within contemporary society. A title can
also identify a work for future reference; for example, if you have heard
the "Barbie Girl" song on the radio and you think that one of your
friends might like to listen to it, you will most likely use the song title to
identify the song to your friend. Domain names can also serve both of
these functions .

A domain name can describe an underlying website

80. Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, 296 F.3d 894, 899 (9th Cir. 2002).
81. Id.

82. Id.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

Id. at 901,907.
Id. at 901.
Id. at 900; see also infra Part IIA.
MCA Records, 296 F.3d at 901.
Lipton, supra note 12, at 1339.
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in the sense of giving some idea of what the user might expect to find on
the site ...A domain name can also identify a relevant website in the
same sense that a book, song, or movie title can identify an underlying

work. This aspect of a domain name practice is unlikely to chance even
if search engines become more sophisticated. 88
Judge Kozinski's analysis of Barbie imagery also suggests another
framework for the merits of Mattel's claims against China Barbie. Since
Barbie has entered "public discourse and become an integral part of our
vocabulary;" her status in American culture is greater than just Mattel's
trademark. 89 He concludes that "Barbie Girl" drew upon Mattel's Barbie as a
cultural icon and "lampoons the Barbie image and comments humorously on
the cultural values she represents. Use of the [trademark] fell within the
noncommercial use exemption to the FTDA, despite the revenue it generated
for Aqua." 90 The court determined the song's value as a work of social
commentary within First Amendment expression outweighed its commercial
value. 9 1 This nuances the conversation about trademark owner's property
rights and free speech rights and renders the non-commercial use exception to
trademark dilution as flexible to judicial interpretation. 92
2.

Freedom of Speech Under the A CPA

Historically, conflict between trademark law and free speech has been
minimal because trademark law was developed with a narrow scope and
the limited goal of consumer confusion prevention regarding the sources of
goods and services. 93 However, commentators fear that the recent
trajectory of trademark property rights, the ACPA included, has turned
trademark law into a much stronger property right than originally
contemplated, which causes tension with free speech.94 Some critics state

88.
89.

Id. at 1339-40.
MCA Records, 296 F.3d at 900; see also infra Part IIA.

90. MCA Records, 296 F.3d at 907.
91. "The commercial success of Barbie Girl establishes beyond dispute that the Barbie
mark" qualifies as a commercial use. Id. at 903.
92. Lipton, supranote 12, at 1342. For example, see MCA Records, 296 F.3d at 905-07.
93. Robert C. Denicola, supra note 12, at 165; see supra Part IA.
94. This tension has been addressed by legislative discussion:
The [ACPA] is carefully and narrowly tailored, however, to extend only to
cases where the plaintiff can demonstrate that the defendant registered,
trafficked in, or used the offending domain name with bad-faith intent to
profit from the goodwill of a mark belonging to someone else. Thus, the
bill does not extend to innocent domain name registrations by those who are
unaware of another's use of the name, or even to someone who is aware of
the trademark status of the name but registers a domain name containing the
mark for any reason other than with bad faith intent to profit from the
goodwill associated with that mark. Paragraph (I)(B) of the new section
43(d) sets forth a number of nonexclusive, nonexhaustive factors to assist a
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that the ACPA "effects a complete appropriation" 95 of a registrant's domain
name based solely on intent. 96 They further claim that it "infringes free
small business and individual interests, and lacks
speech rights, overlooks
97
international scope.,

In particular, the domain name registration system and the ACPA
poorly protect First Amendment rights of free speech due to an inherent
failure to balance speech and commercial trademark interests.98 Some of
this conflict can be attributed to the ACPA's relatively recent enactment
and confusion regarding the appropriate scope of its reach and application
of its principles. 99 Namely, there has been confusion regarding precisely
what is meant by "bad faith" domain name registration and ambiguity
regarding whether a showing of commercial use of the trademark by the
allegedly cybersquatting defendant is necessary.1t°
Overzealous application of the ACPA in domain name regulation risks
chilling Internet free speech.10' This concern has also been expressed
judicially, Judge David Doty of the District Court of Minnesota comments
that,
[w]hile the public interest clearly demands that the Internet be used
responsibly and in conformance with intellectual property laws, the right
of defendant[s] to openly express [their] viewpoint[s] should likewise not
be curtailed absent clearer demonstration that the claims against [them]
have merit . . . Public policy requires that the preliminary injunctions,
especially those that stand to potentially chill a person's right to free
speech, no matter how disagreeable that speech may be, should only be
granted in the most extraordinary of circumstances.

court in determining whether the required bad-faith element exists in any
given case. These factors are designed to balance the property interests of
trademark owners with the legitimate interests of Internet users and others
who seek to make lawful uses of others' marks, including for purposes such
as comparative advertising, comment, criticism, parody, news reporting, fair
use, etc.
H.R. REP. No. 106-412, at 9-10.
95. "1. The exercise of control over property; a taking of possession." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 110 (8th ed. 2004).
96. Snow, supra note 30, at 46 (noting the unconstitutionality of the ACPA's appropriation
of domain names under the takings clause); Lipton, supra note 12, at 1327 (discussing free speech
and domain name policing).
97. Melville, supra note 65, at 327 (2000); see also id. at 327 n.40.
98. S. REP. No. 106-140, at 8; see generally Lipton, supra note 12.
99. Lipton, supra note 12, at 1352.
100. Id. at 1349-50.
101. Id. at 1352.
102. Northland Insurance v. Blaylock, 115 F. Supp. 2d 1108, 1125 (D. Minn. 2000).

HASTINGS COMMIENT L.J.

This suggests that case by case application of the ACPA must be monitored
in order to understand the requirements for a successful claim and monitor when
the ACPA infringes upon First Amendment principles.
III. Mattel's Barbie Doll: A Litigious Icon
It is important to understand the iconic status of Mattel's Barbie doll
product in order to place the China Barbie lawsuit within the context of
Barbie doll's litigious history. Part A will discuss Mattel's Barbie doll as
one of the most successful globally branded children's products in history.
Part B will then discuss how Mattel's history of trademark claims has
interacted with First Amendment principles. Finally, Part C will link this
past pattern of trademark litigation to the context of the Internet and claims
under the ACPA.
A.

Barbie: A Global Icon Fifty Years in the Making

Mattel's Barbie doll is more than just a trademarked toy produced for
child consumption-Barbie has entered public discourse and become a
cultural phenomenon.10 3 Her public image has been crafted, refined, and
protected by Mattel's marketing, development, and legal departments for
nearly fifty years, 10 4 with significant economic implications-Barbie is the
best selling toy doll in the world.'0 5 In 2003, the Ninth Circuit cited that
Barbie has been referred to as "possibly the most famous toy in history and
characterized the doll as "phenomenally successful from the moment of its

103.

Highlighting the importance of such a phenomenon, Rogers argues:
In some people's minds and in some theoretical models, cultural icons like Barbie
represent the lowest common denominators of mass culture. By now, though,
researchers have documented the rich, multifaceted character of cultural icons.
No icon represents only one dimension or axis of a culture. Instead, icons become
such because of their versatility, thick folds of meaning, adaptability to diverse
individuals' needs or interests, ultimate ambiguity, and open-ended nature. In a
sense then, a cultural icon is paradoxical. At one and the same it evokes
commonality and difference. It offers a shared point of reference for society's
members while adapting itself to the cultural differences built up among them.

Mary F. Rogers, BARBIE CULTURE 2-3 (Sage Publications, 1999).
104. See generally supra note 9 for a historical overviews of the product's development,
marketing, and litigation history.
105. Miss Am. Org. v. Mattel, Inc., 945 F.2d 536, 537 (2d Cir. 1991). In 1990, twenty-six million
Barbie dolls were sold, earning gross revenues for Mattel of $740 million. Id Ninety-six percent of
American three to eleven year old girls own at least one Barbie doll. Id. As of 2003, Barbie was sold in
one hundred fifty countries, with world-wide wholesale revenues in excess of over $2 billion each year.
Mattel, Inc. v. Greiner and Hausser GMBH ("Greiner"), 354 F.3d 857, 858-60 (9th Cir. 2003).
Worldwide, two Barbie dolls are sold each second. Steven C. Dublin, Who's that Girl? The World of
Barbie Deconstructed, in THE BARBIE CHRONICLES: A LIVING DOLL TURNS FORTY, supra note 9, at
19.
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introduction;' ' 10 6 she is more than just a doll, Barbie has become a public
figure and cultural icon. Mattel has "bec[o]me the world's largest toy
maker, with Barbie as its flagship product line.' 1 7 Therefore, it is only
appropriate for Mattel to protect Barbie's image from any attempts to
besmirch her reputation, which could detract from Barbie's value as a
children's product.
In addition to Barbie's epic status and economic value in the
children's toy market, she has taken on additional meanings and status at a
societal level. 10 8 As Judge Kozinski so aptly wrote, "[w]ith fame often
comes unwanted attention."' 10 9 She is "an icon and a fetish-to some
angelic to others depraved" and she has inspired artists, writers, and
academics from a variety of fields in a way that suggests she is more than
just a child's toy."l0 "Barbie has become an unmistakable reference point
in our world,"' I'
[she] has been labeled both the ideal American woman and a bimbo. She
has survived attacks both psychic (from feminists critical of her fictitious
figure) and physical (more than 500 professional makeovers). She
remains a symbol of American girlhood, a public figure who graces the
aisles of toy stores throughout the country and
1 2 beyond. With Barbie,
Mattel created not just a toy but a cultural icon. 1
B.

The Clash Between Barbie and the First Amendment

As Barbie achieved iconic status, she also became a frequent visitor to
American courtrooms as the subject of various intellectual property
disputes. "3 Many of these disputes invoked the unauthorized use of Barbie
106.
107.

Greiner, 354 F.3d at 860.
Id.at 861.

108.

Introduction, THE BARBIE CHRONICLES: A LIVING DOLL TURNS FORTY, supra note 9,

at 14.
109.

MCA Records, 296 F.3d at 899.

110.

Introduction, THE BARBIE CHRONICLES: A LIVING DOLL TURNS FORTY, supra note 9,

at 14. "Barbie, and all the associates she has acquired through Mattel's impressive marketing
success, conveys... messages [about society, gender roles, sexuality, and perhaps even social
class] in a particular way that is ripe for social comment." Mattel, Inc. v. Walking Mountain
Productions ("Walking Mountain Productions"), 353 F.3d 792, 802 (9th Cir. 2003). Through

Barbie imagery, artists and social commentators have explored gender, sexuality, race, and body
image. See THE BARBIE CHRONICLES: A LIVING DOLL TURNS FORTY, supra note 9, 37-38, 53,

60, 131.
111. Dublin, supra note 104, at 36.
112. MCA Records, 296 F.3d at 898.
113. Greiner, 354 F.3d 857 at 859; "After nearly 50 makeovers, she is a public figure and a cultural
icon. She's also controversial and very litigious." James B. Astrachan, Commentary: Court calls Mattel's
copyright suit frivolous, DAILY RECORD (BALTIMORE), July 2, 2004, available at
http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi qn4183/is_20040702 /ai.n10062674/print.; see generally Miss

America Ofg., 945 F.2d at 538 (a new line of Miss America fashion dolls manufactured in China were
ordered detained by Mattel because they allegedly copied Barbie doll's face. Miss America sued for an
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14
and her imagery in social commentary, which implicated free speech.,
Traditionally, exclusive trademark rights are justified by a creator's
investment in the exclusive right to these ideas. 1 5 This controlled usage
rationale stems from "tragedy of the commons" theory," 16 which aims to
create incentives for the efficient exploitation of ideas and prevention of
their overuse."i 7 Professors William Landes and Richard Posner elaborate
and suggest that consumers "desire uniformity in their cultural icons" and
allowing an idea to enter the public domain in a variety of contexts, would
reduce its consumer value." 18
If we permit portrayals of Mickey Mouse as a drug dealer, or Barbie
as a porn star, or Scarlet O'Hara abusing her slaves, these countercultural
works will somehow infect the wholesome nature of the icon, ruining it for
everyone else ...the creation of unauthorized works may have a demandreducing effect on all works based on the original, overwhelming what
[... ] is a positive economic effect from reducing price and expanding the
potential market.'19
This debate involves not just who captures the economic value
associated with an icon, but also who controls its meaning at a societal
level. 20 Judge Kozinski positions Barbie's crossover into epic and iconic
status as follows:
[t]rademarks often fill in gaps in our vocabulary and add a contemporary
flavor to our expressions. Once imbued with such expressive value, the
trademark becomes a word in our language and assumes a role outside the
bounds of trademark law... Were we to ignore the expressive value that

injunction to prevent Mattel from interfering with the importation and sale of these dolls in the United
States.); Mattel, Inc v. Goldberger Doll Mfg., 200 F. Supp. 517 (E.D.N.Y.1961) (claiming defendant's
"Babette doll" was confusingly similar to its trademark Barbie); MCA Records, 296 F.3d at 894 (Mattel
brought suit for trademark infringement and dilution against Danish band, Aqua, for their song "Barbie
Girl."); Walking Mountain Productions, 353 F.3d at 796-97 (Mattel sued a photographer who creates
artwork with social and political overtones for copyright, trademark, and trade dress infringement for his
"Food Chain Barbie" series of photographs, which depicts Barbie in "various absurd and often sexualized
positions.").
114. See supra note I11.
115. Lemley, supra note I1, at 129.
116. "The "tragedy of the commons" theory espouses that resources that are commonly owned and
be overused, depleted and then exhausted. Observance of the social phenomenon,
generally available will
currently most often applied to evolutionary, developmental, and behavioral biology, can be traced to Aristotle,
although Ganet Hardin popularized the theory in 1968. Susanna Chenette, Maintainingthe Constitutionality
of the Patent Systen, 35 HASTINGS. CONST. L.Q. 221, 253 n. 203 (2008). See Garret Hardin, The Tragedy of
the Connions, 162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968)
117. Lemley, supra note 11, at 141-42.
118. Id. at 145 (citing William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Indefinitely Renewable
Copyright, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 471 (2003)).
119. Id.
120. Michael Madow, Private Ownership of the Public Image: Popular Culture and
Publicity Rights, 81 CAL. L. REV. 125, 134 (1993).
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some marks assume, trademark rights would grow to encroach upon the
zone protected by the First Amendment... Simply put, the trademark owner
does not have the right to control public discourse whenever the public
21
imbues his mark with a meaning beyond its source-identifying function.
Direct conflict exists between Mattel's interest in controlling usage of its
Barbie doll product and the public's interest in manipulating the Barbie image
to produce new meanings for the larger cultural discourse. 1 2 Professor
Lemley suggests that courts have increasingly deferred to the property rights of
trademark owners, without considering the broader social costs of such
protection. 123 However, courts have balanced Mattel's trademark property
rights and the public's free speech rights in a way that protects the public's
freedom to comment on Barbie's status in popular culture and invoke her
of the Internet
iconic image; although the status of this freedom in the context
1 24
and the website domain name system remains to be clarified.
Judge Kozinski held in favor of Aqua's use of the term "Barbie" in the
title of their song "Barbie Girl," as well as use of Barbie imagery in the
song's content because of Barbie's status as a cultural icon.125 The Court
recognized the importance of Barbie in public discourse, which was beyond
the control of Mattel and its property rights over its Barbie doll
trademark. 26 If these conclusions were translated to the Internet context,
the term "Barbie" would be available for use by domain name registrants to
evoke Barbie imagery as part of a larger public discourse.
Similarly, in Mattel Inc. v. Walking Mountain Productions,127 the Court
allowed artistic creativity and free speech that evoked Barbie to trump Mattel's
copyright and trademark violation claims. 28 Thomas Forsythe, the defendantphotographer, developed a series of photographs entitled "Food Chain Barbie"
depicting Barbie in various absurd and sexualized positions; the word "Barbie"
was even used in some of the titles.' 29 Mattel brought copyright, trademark, and
trademark infringement violation claims in response.' 30 Forsythe defended his
use of Barbie as an attempt to use Barbie to critique the objectification of women
and condemn the "conventional beauty myth" and "societal acceptance of

121.
122.
TEX. L.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.

MCA Records, 296 F.3d 894 at 900.
Justin Hughes, "'Recoding"Intellectual Propertyand Overlooked Audience Interests, 77
REv. 923, 940-41 (1999).
Lemley, supra note 23, at 1697.
See discussion supra Part IIB.
MCA Records, 296 F.3d 894 at 898.
Id. at 900.
353 F.3d 792 (9th Cir. 2003).
Id. at 807.
Id. at 796.
Id.
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women as objects."'' He described the role of Barbie in societal discourse:
"Barbie is the most enduring of those products that feeds on the insecurities of
our beauty and perfection-obsessed consumer culture."' 3 2 The Ninth Circuit
concluded that Forsythe's work was a parody and social commentary of Barbie
and highly transformative-therefore, his use of Mattel's Barbie doll did not
violate Mattel's property rights in the Barbie image. 133 Application of these
principles to the Internet context would suggest that as long as unauthorized use
of Barbie diverged enough from the context of Mattel's Barbie as a children's
toy, it would be protected under free speech.
In Mattel, Inc. v. Pitt,134 Mattel brought copyright and trademark

infringement claims against Susanne Pitt, for her production and sale of
"Dungeon Doll," a product that was a repainted and re-costumed version of
Barbie. 135 Pitt also maintained an Internet website, which depicted
Dungeon Doll in sexually explicit stories and offered sexual paraphernalia
for sale.1 36 She claimed that she wanted to comment on the sexual nature
of Barbie by using "customized Barbie figures in sadomasochistic costume
and/or storylines" to "'resurrect' (sic) the original idea of the female figure
she claims inspired Barbie: a German 'adult cartoon' character called
'137 She
'Lilli' of 'easy virtue.. .[d]efinitely not a childrens [sic] toy.'"
asserted that a sexualized nature was inherent to the doll, which she only
highlighted through its placement in a "modern erotic context. '1 38 The
Court refused to rule in Mattel's favor at summary judgment because "[t]he
sale or display of 'adult' dolls does not appear to be a use Mattel would
likely develop or license others to develop."' 39 This illustrates that
unauthorized Barbie imagery that departs significantly from the Barbie
image Mattel endeavors to maintain is possible without impinging on
Mattel's trademark property rights.

131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 804.
134. 229 F. Supp. 2d 315 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
135. Id. at 318. She also used Mattel's "Superstar Barbie" for the head of her dolls. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 322. Ironically, Barbie's origins lie in the German Bid Lilli doll, which has been
describes as "a lascivious plaything for adult men," based on a postwar comic character who
appeared in the Bild Zeitung, a downscale German newspaper similar to America's National
Enquirer." "The doll, sold principally in tobacco shops, was marketed as a sort of three-dimensional
pinup. In her cartoon incarnation, Lilli was not merely a doxie, she was a German doxie-an iceblond, pixie-nosed specimen of an Aryan ideal-who may have known hardship during the war, but
as long as there were men with checkbooks, was not going to suffer again." M. G. Lord, FOREVER
BARBIE: THE UNAUTHORIZED BIOGRAPHY OF A REAL DOLL 7; see also MCA Records, 296 F.3d at

898.
138.
139.

Pitt, 229 F. Supp.2d at 322.
Id. at 324. No opinion on the further merits of this case was ever issued.
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The Barbie Trademark on the Internet

Courts have given a great amount of deference to the public's free
speech rights in the face of Mattel's repeated trademark infringement and
dilution claims. More recently, Mattel has expanded the scope of its
litigiousness to protecting Barbie from alleged trademark violators in
cyberspace. 140 The courts' historic trajectory of prioritizing free speech
rights leads to the expectation that similar deference would exist in the
Internet context, precisely what the legal community excepted when the
China Barbie complaint was filed. 141 However, courts have not been nearly
142
as deferential in the context of websites and domain name registration.
Mattel's ACPA trademark claim against China Barbie's website domain
name is only Mattel's most recent effort to control Barbie's public image,
despite the disconnect between China Barbie's use of the term "Barbie"
and the scope of Mattel's property rights.
In Mattel, Inc. v. Jcom, 14 3 prior to enactment of the ACPA, Mattel
brought a trademark dilution claim asserting that the Barbie trademark was
diluted by the adult services website maintained by the defendant under the
name "Barbie's Playhouse." 144 The website was designed with a
teleconferencing feature with a female model engaging in sexually explicit
behavior that was available to customers for a per minute fee.145 Judge
Sonia Sotomayor of the Second Circuit concluded that the model
performing these services may not have intended to trade on the goodwill
of Mattel's trademark.1 46 However, by the time the website was functional
and available to consumers, the intent to evoke Mattel's trademarked
product was present,
The font in which B[arbie] was set forth on the Web site is almost
indiscernible from the font Mattel uses in connection with the sale of
B[arbie] dolls. The differences can only be seen when one puts them side
by side. The fonts are so similar that anyone looking at them would

140. In addition to the domain name disputes highlighted below, Mattel has also brought
actions against an online swimwear retailer for the domain names www.barbiesbeachwear.com
and barbiesclothing.com. (Mattel, Inc. v. Adventure Apparel, 2001 WL 1035140 at *1 (S.D.N.Y.
2001); against a series of fifty seven domain names that evoked a variety of Mattel's trademarked
toys including www.barbie-club.com and www.princessbarbie.com (Mattel, Inc. v. BarbieClub.com, 310 F.3d 293, 295 (2d Cir. 2002)); and the domain name www.barbieshop.com, which
was the Internet presence of an adult retail store located in Canada, owned by Barbara Anderson
a/k/a Barbie Walley (Mattel, Inc. v. Barbara Anderson, 2005 WL 1690528 at *1 (S.D.N.Y 2005).
141. See supra note 6.
142. See infra Part IIC.
143. 48 U.S.P.Q.2d 1467 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).
144. Id. at 1468. The exact website URL was http://www.jcomlive.com/barbie.htm. Id.
145. Id. at 1468-69.
146. Id. at 1469.
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automatically think that defendants chose their font to copy Mattel's
B[arbie] trademark. The use of the word 'playhouse' with the word
'Barbie' could have only been linked in [the defendant's]
mind to Mattel's
147
product, despite his statements to the contrary.
Judge Sotomayor enjoined Jcom from further dilution of the Mattel
Barbie trademark and use of the mark "Barbie's Playhouse. ' 48 In Mattel,
Inc. v. Jeom, it seems that the Court's decision turned on more than just the
defendant's use of the word "Barbie," but rather on the website's look and
feel, including use of Mattel's trademarked signature Barbie font. In
contrast, China Barbie only utilized the word "Barbie" in her domain
name, 149 which was identical to the stage name she continues to utilize. 15
In Mattel, Inc. v. Internet Dimensions,15 1 Mattel brought a similar suit
against
an
adult
entertainment
website
maintained
at
www.barbiesplaypen.com after ACPA enactment.152 The website's front
page featured the word "Barbie" in "approximately the same font" as
Mattel's signature Barbie font. 153 Judge Harold Baer of the Southern
District of New York awarded Mattel ownership of the domain name and
ruled that the defendant intended to profit by associating its site name with
the Mattel dolls. 154 He wrote,

The Barbie dolls, with their long blond hair and anatomically improbable
dimensions are ostensibly intended to portray wholesomeness to young
girls. The 'models' on the barbiesplaypen.com site, although many have
long hair and anatomically improbable dimensions,
can in no way be
155
described as engaging in 'wholesome' activities.
He continued, "The obvious intent of the defendants is to cash in on
the favorable public image of the Barbie doll, including the image of a
' 156
particular kind of feminine appearance and character."
Similar to Mattel, Inc. v. Jcom, the defendant's action in Mattel, Inc. v.
Internet Dimensions illustrated an intent to evoke more than just the idea of
"Barbie." 157 The models were meant to appear as real life Barbie dolls and the
look and feel of the website also evoked Mattel's Barbie and the concept of
147.
148.
149.

Id.
Id. at 1471.
See Hasani Gittens, Barbie Hussy-Fit Over China Doll: Mattel Sues to KO Porn-Star
'Barbie' Site, NEW YORK POST, Aug. 22, 2007.
150. See infra note 183 and accompanying text.
151. 2000 WL 973745 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
152. Id. at*1.
153. Id.at *3.
154. Id.at *4-6.
155. Id. at*8.
156. Id.
157. Id. at*8.
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'
"play."158
In contrast, China Barbie did not aim to evoke the look and feel of
159
Mattel's trademarks, nor does she attempt to evoke a real life Barbie doll.
This suggests that Mattel's suit against China Barbie would not have been
successful if tried on its merits. However, due to China Barbie's default, the suit
was fairly uneventful. 160 This history of domain name litigation against adult
services websites, in addition to a more generalized history of Mattel's trademark
litigation, puts China Barbie into perspective as a continuation of Mattel's
161
litigious history aiming to ensure Barbie's value is not eroded as a child's toy.

IV. Barbie and the ACPA's Overprotection of
Trademark Property Rights
The paradigm of Mattel's Barbie doll and litigation involving the Internet
illustrates that trademark owners' property interests should not be given
priority over the public's free speech rights. Part A will argue that "Barbie"
actually evokes two distinct ideas: a trademarked product and a cultural icon in
public discourse that is separate from Mattel's trademark. Then, Part B will
evaluate how courts have applied the ACPA in cases involving Barbie, and
will subsequently argue that the ACPA was enacted to apply to a much
narrower scope of circumstances that does not include the types of claims that
have been brought forth by Mattel. Part C will question the productivity of
pursuing lawsuits like that against China Barbie. Finally, Part D will present a
possible alternative framework for analyzing domain name disputes.
A.

Barbie's Dual Status as a Trademarked Product and Cultural Icon

Barbie has become integral in American popular culture, suggesting
that the trajectory of Mattel's trademark rights to Barbie should be
considered distinct from the concept of Barbie in public discourse. This is
best understood by separating the idea of Barbie into two distinct roles: It is
a trademarked Mattel children's product and a cultural icon that has
evolved through public discourse and manipulation. This is at the heart of
the tension between trademark property rights and free speech regarding
Barbie.

158. Id.
159. Accompanying the New York Post's article about Mattel's complaint against China
Barbie the Post also published a chart that compares Barbie doll and China Barbie's
measurements and statistics. See Gittens, supra note 149.
160. Mattel, Inc. v. Global China Networks, LLC, 2007 WL 3332662, at *1.
161. "Not only important legal issues but also high economic stakes are packaged in these
petite plastic figures." Miss Am. Org., 945 F.2d at 537.
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Trademarks, like other words and symbols, aim to enter society's
"common vocabulary" to accumulate connotations and associations.162
However, if a trademark's entry into common vocabulary goes too far, it
leads to the "death" of the trademark and its original denotation, imposing
significant costs on the trademark owner.' 63 In contrast, increased
"propertizing" of trademarks, beyond advertising mechanisms to sell
products, may impose significant social costs, including curtailment of free
speech. 164 Over-propertizing is exemplified by Mattel's litigiousness with
its Barbie trademark, as represented by the numerous trademark suits
it has
65
contexts.'
unauthorized
in
Barbie
of
use
the
undertaken to prevent
Professor Yochai Benkler describes Barbie's "dual role" as it relates
to her Internet presence in The Wealth of Networks: How Social Production
Transforms Markets and Freedom, where he conducted a simple Internet
search for "Barbie" using Google. His search returned results ranging from
Mattel's official website and the official collectors' website, to
AdiosBarbie.com (a website that is critical of Barbie), a Barbie and Ken
sex animation, and Barbie dressed as a suicide bomber. 166 Based on these
results he reasons,
A nine-year-old girl searching Google for Barbie will quite quickly find
links to AdiosBarbie.com, to the Barbie Liberation Organization (BLO),
and to other, similarly critical sites interspersed among those dedicated
to selling and playing with the doll. The contested nature of the doll
becomes publicly and everywhere apparent, liberated from the confines
of feminist-criticism symposia and undergraduate courses. This simple
Web search represents both of the core contributions of the networked
information economy. First, from the perspective of the searching girl, it
represents a new transparency of cultural symbols. Second, from the
perspective of the participants in AdiosBarbie or the BLO, the girl's use
of their site completes their own quest to participate in making the
cultural meaning of Barbie.167
Courts have also generally recognized this "dual role" and have
flexibly applied trademark law to ensure that Barbie's position in popular
culture and its associated trajectory remains separate and distinct from
Mattel's property interest in its children's product. 168 One legal scholar
notes, "modem expression frequently requires the use of trademarks in
162. Peter Johnson, Book Review: Can You Quote Donald Duck? Intellectual Property in
Cyberculture, 13 YALE J. LAW & THE HUMANITIES 451, 459 (2001).
163. Id.
164. Lemley, supra note 23, at 1593, 1697.
165. See supra Part JiB.
166. Yochai Benkler, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS: How SOCIAL PRODUCTION
TRANSFORMS MARKETS AND FREEDOM 286, table 8.1 (Yake University Press, 2006).
167. Benkler, supra note 170, at 277.
168. See supra Part IIB-C.
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their role as social referents, whether or not the product itself is being
discussed directly., 169 This is precisely the idea Judge Kozinski struggled
with in Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records:
Were we to ignore the expressive value that some marks assume,
trademark rights would grow to encroach upon the zone protected by the
First Amendment .... [T]rademark owner[s] [do] not have the right to
control public discourse whenever the public imbues
his mark with a
0
meaning beyond its source identifying function.17
B. Barbie's Dual Status Creates Tension in ACPA Enforcement
While it seems that all the conflicting ideas residing within Professor
Benkler's Google search results can coexist, their contradictory nature pose a
number of complications when applied to domain name enforcement on the
Internet. First Amendment commentators remain concerned that Intemet
regulation threatens freedom of speech, "[m]ore regulability means more
constraints, which by definition, means less freedom, as freedom is reasonably
constructed as an absence of constraint." 17' Most Internet litigation that calls
for the inclusion and consideration of trademark law involves domain name
disputes under the ACPA; 17 2 which makes it increasingly important to balance
trademark protection in regards to domain names and First Amendment
principles appropriately. Professor Lemley identifies the risks of failure to
strike an appropriate balance by arguing that cybersquatting precedent provides
a foundation to take domain names away from "legitimate users," including
individuals who want to register their last names as their website domains and
those who want to create a "gripe site" as a forum to discuss a product or
business. 173 Domain names are unique and cannot be simultaneously shared
by multiple parties. Furthermore, businesses have an interest in ensuring easy
and efficient access to their Internet presence. 74 Therefore, an implicit policy
decision is made that fails to accommodate free speech in enforcement of the
Internet domain name system because higher priority is awarded to the
protection of trademark owners from the threats of cybersquatters, as
exemplified by Mattel's claim against China Barbie.
Mattel's litigation against domain names that include the term Barbie,
particularly websites that provide adult entertainment services, is an
especially troubling case for this discussion. Cultural critics note that

169. Lemley, supra note 23 at 1711.
170. MCA Records, 296 F.3d at 900.
171. Steven Hetcher, Climbing the Walls of Your Electronic Cage, 98 MICH. L. REV. 1916,
1931 (2000).
172. Lemley, supra note 23, at 1703.
173. Id.
174. See supra Part IB2.
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Barbie represents a perfectly plastic blonde with exaggerated female body
proportions and has entered our public discourse as a sexual icon.1 75 Courts
have discussed and recognized this iconic status generally in trademark
litigation,176 but have been much more hesitant in the Internet context under
the ACPA. 177
Moreover, the use of a Barbie domain name for
pornographic purposes raises even more complex issues, as it seems that
this type of activity has been pre-condemned by the legislative bodies. The
House of Representatives' Report on the Trademark Cyberpiracy
Prevention Act of 1999 clearly states in the "Purpose and Summary"
section that the posting of pornographic materials by cybersquatters is
particularly egregious, as it effectively increases the likelihood that
78
cybersquatters will collect ransom by damaging the integrity of the mark.
However, this statement assumes that any posting of pornographic
materials on a confusingly similar domain name was done with purposeful
bad faith and the intent of cybersquatting.
Upon analysis of the ACPA and consideration of this conflict, it is
clear that the statute has little practical applicability outside of the context
of true cybersquatting, even though the statute has spawned many more
general claims for domain name ownership. The ACPA was initially
designed to make up for the "perceived shortcomings" of the FTDA in the
cybersquatting context to provide additional protection for trademark
owner's property and to eliminate cybersquatters from reserving domain
names and preventing businesses from registering their own Internet
presence and profiting from the trademark owner's "good will" and need to
establish itself according to is true name through reselling the domain name
to them. 179 Therefore, though the legislative intent in enacting the ACPA
was to limit its applicability to bad faith registration, the meaning of bad
faith registration needs to be further clarified in order to prevent
unnecessary taking of domain names from registrants
who did not intend to
1 80
goodwill.
owner's
trademark
the
on
infringe
However, Mattel, Inc. v. Global China Networks indicates that some
trademark owners have brought ACPA claims where no true cybersquatting
occurred, but trademarked terms were merely included in the domain name.
175. Mattel has not been oblivious, retired Mattel toy designer Joe Cannizzaro has been
quoted as saying, " think if you look at the silhouette of the Playboy Bunny, it looks like a Barbie
doll ... So do men want to date a Barbie doll? Probably. But do men notice it? Only if shown.
They wouldn't go looking for it." M. G. Lord, supra note 9, at 200.
176. See Pitt, 229 F. Supp.2d at 315; Greiner, 354 F.3d at 857; Walking Mountain
Productions,353 F.3d at 792.
177. See supra Part IIC.
178. H.R. REP. NO. 106-412, at 5.
179. Cook, supra note 22, at 257.
180. Kindel, supra note 18, at 2114.
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This is problematic because it effectively deprives domain name owners of
their free speech rights.181 Mattel's goal was to ensure that no one else
operated a website at this domain name, but Mattel never expressed intent to
maintain a website of its own at the domain name. This is particularly
troubling for the context of China Barbie's use of the term "Barbie," because
the term has passed into "public discourse"1' 82 and has many more connotations
83
and layers of meaning that beyond Mattel's trademark property rights.1
C.

Was Mattel, Inc. v. Global China Networks Productive Litigation?

It is unclear what Mattel accomplished by bringing suit against China
Barbie. Following her failure to answer the complaint and the default
84
judgment, China Barbie's domain name has been transferred to Mattel.1
However, she continues to call herself China Barbie, and has developed
another moniker, "China B.' 85 Her MySpace.com homepage is still
registered under the pseudonym "China Barbie," though she has transferred
her website to www.brownandready.com. 186 Ironically, as of December
2007, her Brown and Ready MySpace homepage continued to state the
following in "About me" section, "I am China B(arbie).' ' 187 Through the
clever use of parentheses she continues to use her moniker, perhaps
hopefully in an attempt to not turn up in a general Google search for the
88
term. 1
In effect, Mattel's suit has not prevented her from continuing to use
this pseudonym, but actually brought her services more attention,
"[China] Barbie said that her site usually gets about 100 views a day, but
[the day after this suit was filed] it received more than 100,000."I" This
suggests that even though Mattel had a legal victory through default in
this case, the law did not actually serve its purpose. Filing this lawsuit
did not eliminate the Internet presence of China Barbie; instead the
181. Cook, supra note 22, at 267.
182. MCA Records, 296 F.3d at 900.
183. See supra Part II.A.
184. Global China Networks, 2007 WL 3332662, at *1.
185. See Brown and Ready MySpace Page, http://www.myspace.com/brownandready (last
visited: September 5, 2008); China Barbie MySpace Page, http://www.myspace.com/ chinabarbie
(last visited: September 5, 2008). See also www.brownandready.com.
186. Id.
187. Id. (Screenshots of December 2007 page available from author upon request.) Though
her MySpace no longer states this claim, as of September 2008, her MySpace page continue to
state in various contexts that this was a "China B Studios" Production.
188. China Barbie's MySpace Page was one of the top items that returned from a Google search
using the terms "China Barbie" in December 2007 despite this effort. Other results consisted of
material created by China Barbie hosted by other websites; references to this lawsuit; and news reports
regarding Mattel's defectively manufactured Chinese toys.
189. Gittens, supra note 6.
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lawsuit increased her popularity. Moreover, the Court's decision has not
stopped her from going by the alias "China Barbie," she just merely
relocated her website to a new domain name. The ACPA did not only fail
Mattel, the trademark owner in this case, but it generally fails to remedy
trademark owners' concerns. 90 In its present form, the ACPA requires
trademark owners to track down infringing domain names one-by-one.
This piecemeal approach does not allow a trademark owner, or courts, to
1 91
develop a broader comprehensive policy for this type of behavior.
Therefore, not only do the ACPA and its enforcement threaten the
public's First Amendment principles, but it also fails to accomplish its
stated purpose on behalf of trademark owners. Without clearer guidance
from the legislature or courts, the ACPA will continue to remain
ineffective.
D.

An Alternative Framework for Analyzing Domain Name Property Rights

An alternative approach emerges if domain names were viewed as signifiers
that identify the underlying work, much like a book, song, or movie titles conveys
the content of the work. 192 For example, in the context of parody and gripe
websites, the inclusion of trademarked terms in domain names is perceived as a
193
signifier of the content of the website contains for individuals who encounter it.
The test courts have applied in the context of book, song, and movie titles, as
exemplified by Judge Kozinski's approach and discussed above, is probably the
best example for how trademark owners' property rights and the public's free
speech rights may be balanced more effectively in the domain name registration
system. 194 There is no dispute that the song's use of the Barbie image was
commercially successful, but Judge Kozinski looked to the legislative history of
the trademark dilution act and concluded that constitutionally protected speech was
an exception to its applicability.' 95 The "Barbie Girl" song title did not constitute a
trademark infringement or dilution because the title signified that the song
commented on Barbie's image in society.' 96 The Court focuses in on the fact that
it is unlikely that Aqua's use of the term Barbie would confuse consumers as to the
source of the product or dilute Mattel's trademark because its use was for
expressive purposes. 197

190. Elizabeth M. Flanagan, Note, No Free Parking: Obtaining Relief from Trademark
Infringing Domain Name Parking,92 MINN. L. REv. 498, 517-18 (2007).
191. Id.
192. Lipton, supra note 12, at 1340.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. MCA Records, 296 F.3d at 903, 905.
196. Lipton, supra note 12, at 1340-41.
197. MCA Records, 296 F.3d at 899-900.
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Applying these principles to domain names containing the term
Barbie, suggests that none of Mattel's trademark property interests are
violated. As determined in the Southern District of New York in the
context of the "Dungeon Doll" product, invoking Barbie in a sexual context
that is out of character from Mattel's use is highly "transformative. 198
Through hosting her adult entertainment website at www.chinabarbie.com,
China Barbie's use of the term "Barbie" plays on the popular imagery
Barbie has come to evoke similar to many artists and writers in the past.
As China Barbie clearly pointed out in an interview with the New York
'1 9 9
Post, "I'm not marketing myself to children, in any way shape or formn."
V. Conclusion
Barbie, both a successful children's toy and cultural icon with many
layers of meaning, creates a truly unique paradigm through which to analyze
the appropriateness of the scope of newly developed trademark property rights
and the public's free speech rights. Courts have successfully balanced these
interests under trademark dilution theory, but have not been nearly as
successful in the context of the Internet. The Internet provides new frontiers
for communication, consumerism, and the balancing act between intellectual
property and the First Amendment. The Internet domain name system and the
ACPA are not responsive its evolving and changing nature and should be
revised with a deeper understanding of the First Amendment and the
expressive nature of a domain name, much like a song, book, or movie title.
Otherwise, smaller domain name owners will continue to lose their domain
name rights to larger, monopolistic trademark owners.

198.
199.

Pitt, 229 F. Supp. 2d at 321-22.
Gittens, supranote 6.

